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Summary 
In this paper, I shall study the problem of winners and losers in the Gulf War in four parts: 1-
The Balance of Powers in the Middle East and their Resources 
1-prior to the war; 
2-Coalition Formation and the Execution of the War; 
3-Immediate and Developing Problems after the War; 
4-Projected Longer Term Outcomes of the War. 
Initially I shall look into the ambiguous relationships of Iraq, Iran and other M.E. players with 
the United States and the former colonial powers since World War II. From this baseline, I shall 
attempt to clarify the coalitions and the devastation of the War. In the third phase, I wish to 
throw some light on the problems Iraq now faces, and the problems the entire region must deal 
with as a result of the sanctions against Iraq. Finally I shall make some observations about what 
might happen in the region as other Great Power players assume important roles in the region. 
 
Power Bases in The Middle East in 1990 
In the central Middle Eastern lands in the year 1990, there were six countries possessing 
what we might term "Middle Range Power," based on such factors as a strong army, close 
relations with the U.S., or financial stability because of oil wealth. These countries included 
Israel, Turkey, Iraq, Iran, Syria, and Egypt. Israel, Turkey and Egypt, basically surrogates of the 
U.S., depended heavily on U.S. subsidies, military equipment and special trade agreements. 
Iran, after the Khomeini revolution in 1979, had attempted to inflame the Middle East against 
the "Great Satan," the United States, and hence was on the U.S. list of outlaw nations. For this 
reason, when the Iran and Iraq War broke out in 1981, the U.S. sided with Iraq and supplied 
Saddam Husain with chemical, biological and military weapons and also fed Iraq strategic 
information on the Iranian military. This led to Iran’s suing for peace in 1988 even though it 
was basically a stronger and more populous state. It is also ironic to observe that both Iraq 
and Iran were oil-rich states, and both states greatly decreased oil production during the war. 
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American oil companies were pleased because their decreased production meant that U.S. 
companies would receive higher prices for their inefficient wells. 
 
II. The Occupation of Kuwait and The Shift in Alliances 
Whether or not, in hindsight, the United States was simply lax in recognizing an Iraqi threat 
to Kuwait or indeed conspired to suck Iraq into a trap, one cannot ascertain at this time. 
Nevertheless, however strong Iraq’s legal claim was to Kuwaiti territory(1) or however much 
the Kuwaitis had stolen oil from the border oilfields or otherwise 
provoked Iraq, the Iraqi leadership should have known that the U.S. and Britain would not 
accept a violent realignment of borders in the the oil-sensitive Gulf region. Britain, in 
particular, had worked over a half century to legitimize its grabbing of Kuwaiti territory from 
the Ottoman Turks in 1898, and thereafter, had, in the Treaty of Uqair of 1922, forced Iraq to 
accept the re-drawn borders of Kuwait which greatly limited the Iraqi access to the Gulf. It is 
clear also that the U.S. would react quickly to any threat to its surrogate, Saudi Arabia, from 
which it was drawing so much of its current oil needs. Thus, when the Iraqis occupied Kuwait 
on August 2, 1990, the U.S. and Britain began working assiduously to build a coalition of states 
which would stand with them to crush Iraq. (2) Contrary to what was initially imagined about 
the difficulty of forming a coalition, in the absence of a contervailing Great Power like the 
Soviet Union, the U.S. had little trouble in gaining new support from old enemies. 
At the suggestion of the Saudis, who felt very threatened because the U.S. had few troops or 
naval vessels in the Gulf region, the U. S. began a massive troop buildup without reporting 
much in the press. During this build-up the U.S. Air Force Chief of Staff, General Michael 
Dugan, got himself fired on September 17, 1990 by Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, for 
saying that the Iraqi army would be a pushover, but that the Air Force must play the key role 
in destroying Iraq’s infrastructure and will to fight. Actually Dugan’s remarks were prophetic 
about the war’s outcome. (3) After the U.N. sanctions against Iraq were declared in August of 
1990, discussions continued among the heads of the U.S. government to decide which method, 
economic sanctions or outright attack and war, would remove Iraq from Kuwait. General 
Powell, Head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, meanwhile had built up the U.S. forces in Saudi Arabia 
by December to 230,000 troops and supporting units. 
It was decided, sometime in early December, that force would be the method of choice of 
President Bush, thus rendering the so-called inegotiations on January 9, 1991, of Secretary of 
State, James Baker, and Tariq Aziz, Iraqi Foreign Minister, basically useless and insincere on 
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the part of the United States. Rather, it was an occasion for the U.S. to present its 
ultimatum..The U.N. Security Council, with the support of Foreign Minister Shevardnadze of 
Russia and abstention of China, passed its fateful resolution to use "All Necessary Means" to 
remove Iraq from Kuwait after January 15, 1991. Interesting, in the light of future 
developments, Admiral Crowe, former head of the Joint Chiefs, opposed, to the end, the use of 
force declaring that the policy would, in future years, backfire on the Americans in their 
relations with the Arab World because the Arabs would not forget the killing of their fellow 
Muslims. Admiral Crowe made a number of enemies by his honest stance because Congress 
only narrowly supported going to war and many European and Asian nations that had sent 
token troops and given their support to Washington were under great pressure in their 
homelands not to go to war.(4) 
It remains to note how the United States was able to cajole the "Middle Range"Middle 
Eastern countries into joining the alliance against Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. In the case of Iran, 
the only position desired from the Ayatullahs was that they remain neutral. They complied 
because the country had suffered greatly from the war with Iraq, and Saddam’s government 
continued to suppress its majority Shi’ites, the co-religionists of Iranians. 
In spite of the fact that Egypt, since Sadat’s peace with Israel in 1979, was receiving 
massive food subsidies and generally keeping itself out of Arab conflicts, President Mubarek 
had a tough time bringing Egypt into the alliance because of a strong anti-American religious 
faction. To overcome the reluctance of Egypt, the U.S. agreed to eliminate some 8 billion 
dollars of Egypt’s debt to the United States. Hence, Egypt, who also had a close relationship 
with Saudi Arabia, including many professionals working in the government, sided with the 
building U.S. coalition. Also, because of the close cooperation of Morocco with the U.S., 
Morocco was asked to join the coalition. The Saudis themselves felt uneasy fighting fellow 
Muslims without the support of other Arab countries. Moreover, a number of the Saudi Ulema 
were strongly opposed to the build-up of U.S. troops on Saudi soil. 
President Asad of Syria saw a golden chance to improve his relations with the United States 
by joining the U.N. coalition; hence, he sent 20,000 troops, a major effort. Later, the excellent 
journalist, Judith Miller, made a detailed analysis of why Asad joined. He had seen the 
approaching collapse of the Soviet Union before 1989 which had supported him for many 
years against Israel and the United States. Moreover, Syria had received regular subsidies 
from the Saudi royal family since the 1970s for its anti-Israel stance. After the Gulf War, in 
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which no Syrian troops were committed, Asad received a handsome reward from the Saudis, 
one billion dollars.(5) 
Many basic financial interests of Turkey were deeply disturbed by the Gulf War. At the 
time, Iraq was paying subsidies to Turkey for the regular piping of Iraqi petroleum to the 
Mediterranean. Also, Turks reputedly conducted some one billion dollars worth of trade in 
manufacturing, chemicals and agriculture with Iraq. Moreover, the Islamic faction in Turkey 
had grown to major proportions and had, to a great extent, supported the anti-US and anti-
Israeli stance of Iraq and certain other Muslim countries. The Turks, however, were, building 
huge hydro-electric facilities on the Tigris and Euphrates rivers which cut the flow of water to 
the agricultural lands of both Iraq and Syria. Also the Kurdish question in Turkey was 
festering, supported intermittently by factions in Syria and Iraq. These larger political and 
economic matters caused many Turks in high places to seek, by any means available, to 
weaken Iraq. 
Finally, there was another very important gamble. The Ataturk government in Turkey, as 
far back as 1925, had lost its bid to retain control of some of the oil rich regions of northern 
Iraq after a League of Nations negotiation. Hence, the Turks always continued to seek ways of 
gaining back some of this lost territory. (6) As we shall note, this ambition has never ceased. 
The state of Israel is the last of the "Middle Range Powers" to play a role in the Gulf War. In 
his most perceptive study of U.S.- Israeli relations, The United States and Israel, The Limits of 
the Special Relationship, Abraham Ben Zvi discusses in great depth the "pattern of interaction 
between the special relationship and national interest paradigms."(7) In other words, Ben Zvi 
discusses those times when the U.S. government had little leverage over Israel because of the 
Jewish lobby and other considerations which used the "special relationship"argument. At 
other times, because of circumstances beyond Israel’s control, the U.S. government had a 
wider choice of options to deal with the complex Middle Eastern issues. At such times, the U.S. 
Government could pursue courses of action deemed more in the "national U.S. interest" rather 
than "in the interest of Israel," narrowly conceived. At the time of the Gulf crisis, the U.S. went 
to considerable trouble to bring Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and especially Syria, into an anti-Iraq 
coalition. Thus, U.S. strategists in Washington did not want Israel to play any overt role in the 
war, even after Saddam Husain provoked Israel by sending some SCUD missiles into Israeli 
territory. It was perceived, rightly or wrongly, that the coalition would collapse if Israel 
intervened. To ward off such a decision the U.S. made every effort to wipe out the SCUD 
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launching vehicles, and also provided Israel with its latest ground-to-air missile defense 
system. 
At about the same time, in 1989-90, within Israel and among Jewish supporters abroad, a 
changing atmosphere was coalescing around the idea that Prime Minister Shamir’s Likud 
Party approach to the Palestinian Intifada, of simply suppressing the Arabs, was ineffectual 
and losing world support for Israel. Now popular support in the U.S. and Israel shifted to the 
idea that for the sake of peace, Israel should be willing to give up some of the territory it had 
seized from the Palestinian. And of course this position corresponded to the position of the 
Labor Party and eventually accounts for it once again taking control of the government. 
Naturally, this internal searching in Israel strengthened the U.S. government, after the Gulf 
crisis, in its desire to bring Israel into direct negotiations with the Palestinians, Jordan, 
Lebanon and especially Syria.(8) 
 
Winners and Losers, Ten Years After The Gulf War 
When one considers that the population of Iraq in 1990 was one of the most-advanced and 
best-educated in the Middle East, but today it is possibly the most-undernourished of lands of 
the Middle East, unable to provide proper health care or clean water to its citizenry, one must 
try to understand Why. After all, Iraq reputedly possesses the second largest oil reserve in the 
world. And, is there not presently a world oil shortage because OPEC is refusing to pump all 
the oil we would like to use? By 1947, the Western Powers and NATO virtually forgave 
Germany for its support of Hitler and the destruction of Europe and began to pour billions in 
aid money into Europe under the Marshall Plan. Underneath the surface was the discovery of 
one of Europe’s basic economic facts: if one destroys a major player in the international 
economy, then one cannot expect the recovery of a vital society like Western Europe. This 
calculation has not yet seeped into the policy-makers in Washington with regard to Iraq. 
Without Iraq, to which we might add Iran, the U.S. and Britain, and their other supporters, risk 
a long-term stagnation in the economy of the Middle East. 
Yet today the U.S. persists pell-mell in supporting an almost complete economic blockade of 
Iraq and Iran. Unfortunately, the U.N. has become a surrogate of the United States in its 
policies toward Iraq. The so-called 661 Sanctions Committee, under the control of the Security 
Council, gives each member of the l5 member council a veto on any shipments to Iraq. "The 
U.S., not surprising, is the most active in blocking contracts, followed well-behind by Britain." 
(9) Some of the items recently denied were as follows: 
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foot-and-mouth disease vaccine for cattle, telecommunications equipment, refrigerator 
trucks to transport medicine and parishable foods in 120 degree heat, new printing presses, 
many kinds of medicine, especially chemo-therapy drugs, (10) chemicals such as chlorine and 
aluminum sulfate for use in water purification plants, motors for ordinary industrial use, and 
so forth. The excuse always is that such materials can be used to make weapons of mass 
destruction in spite of the fact that many U.N. inspectors have resigned and spoken out that 
Iraq has no weapons capability. 
If one looks at the so-called "Middle Range Powers" of the Middle East today, it is very easy 
to conclude that NO POWER, INCLUDING THE UNITED STATES, is better off. In fact, one can 
easily make a case that the Middle East is in worse shape today than for many years. Iran is 
deadlocked between two politico-religious forces, the forces of reform and the reactionary 
clerical powers of the Ayatollahs. The Russians, under President Putin, will not long tolerate 
the open attempt of U.S. oil companies to syphon off the oil riches of Azarbaijan and 
Kazakhstan. It is only a matter of time before the Russian imperial instincts re-assert 
themselves. Steven Cohen of New York University, foremost student of modern Russian 
politics, holds firmly to this position. 
The Syrian army has too long dissipated its prowess, involved in the black markets of 
Lebanon, to remain a formidable military force. Moreover the neglect of modern technology 
under Asad has weakened the competitive edge of a once thriving merchant society. 
The Israeli army, always touted as the greatest, has greatly weakened its moral position 
and the international position of Israel by shooting hundreds of unarmed Palestinians. Also, 
the ultra-right religious parties have helped split Israel socially to a point where thousands of 
Israelis wish to emigrate. 
With the critical state of King Fahd’s health, one must begin to consider the future policies 
of the crown prince, Abdullah of Saudi Arabia, whose family belong to the old Shammar tribal 
federation with clansman stretching clear to Baghdad. Clearly the United States and Britain, 
by continuing the sanctions against Iraq ad infinitum, have destroyed their moral position in 
the Middle East with most Muslims. 
The Turkish military suppressed the Islamic-leaning Welfare Party, while at the same time 
destroying thousands of Kurdish villages in order to weaken an insipiate national Kurdish 
movement for national recognition. This animosity towards the Kurds has given Turkey also 
an excuse to perpetrate cross-border raids into Iraqi Kurdish territory, but Middle East 
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watchers have not forgotten Turkey’s interest in regaining control of the Kirkuk oil fields. U.S. 
silence about these cross-border raids will bring much grief to the U.S. in the years to come. 
Egypt under President Mubarak has done what it always has to do: face up to a population 
growth that eats up any surplus in national resources. At the same time, with the greater 
pollution and salination of the Nile, both from Sudan’s Saudi-sponsored irrigation projects and 
its own need to claim agricultural land for housing spells disaster for an exploding population. 
The U.S. also is not helping its image in Egypt for continuing the incaceration of the elderly 
and ailing Sheikh Abdurrahman for his complicity in the plot to blow up the World Trade 
Center. 
The U.S., rather than take the Trade Center threat as a clarion call for a radical change in its 
foreign policies in the Middle East, has used that as an excuse to attack such targets as Ben 
Laden in Afghanistan and a Sudanese pharmaceutical plant stressing that "radical Islam" 
presents a challenge to the U.S. comparable to the threat of the Soviet Union in previous 
decades. The outside observer might well conclude that this rattling of the sword is only 
meant to serve U.S. domestic needs so that the C.I.A., the F.B.I. and the U.S. Defense 
Department will be able to increase their yearly budgets. The problem with this rationale, 
however, is that no people or religious movement likes to be scapegoated when it is clear to 
the trained observer that the U.S., by continuing such attrocities as the sanctions against Iraq 
or the funding of Israel’s settlement policy against the Palestinians, or the indiscriminate 
bombing of other countries, brings its own form of mayhem to the World. And the World can 
retaliate as we recently observed in the bombing of the U.S. Destroyer Cole in Aden harbor. In 
a devastating attack on the U.S. 
Iraq Policy, the well-known M.I.T. professor, Noam Chomsky, points out clearly that the 
peoples of the world, who have their meager natural resources to sell to the Northern 
Countries including the U.S., want naturally to have a say in the price such resources 
command in the world market. Professor Chomsky puts forth the proposition that some 
governments may find it easier to "thin out"the population of a country whose resources are 
deemed "vital" so that said resources may be exploited with little or no opposition. 
"What we say, goes" was George Bush’s definition of the New World Order in 199l while 
bombs rained down on Iraq. Madeleine Albright, the US Secretary of State rather echoed the 
same policy when she stated on national television in 1996, when asked about the sanctions 
killing 500,000 Iraqi children. Her reply, as quoted by many writers, "We think the price is 
worth it."(11) Unfortunately, this writer sees only losers after the terribly one-sided, so-called 
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Gulf War of 1991. Yes, remove Saddam Husain, but let the people live, all over the Middle East. 
In passing, any serious student of the Gulf War should also read Seymour Hersh’s devastating 
attack on General McCaffrey who "heroically"led his brigade against the retreating Iraqis after 
they had lay down their arms and reversed their tank guns on the road to Basra. (12) One 
wonders what international standards the U.S. military was following by not punishing the 
officer responsible. The World is not waiting for this New World Order. 
 
 
Notes 
1. This writer believes that the Iraqis, based on Ottoman Empire antecedents, has a good historical claim. 
See Michael Bishku, "Iraq’s Claim to Kuwait: An Historical View," Amercian-Arab Affairs, No. 37(Summer, 1991), 
77-88. 
2. Already in April of 1990, the Saudi Ambassador to the U.S. Prince Bandar bin Sultan had been sent by 
King Fahad of Saudi Arabia to Baghdad to understand what Saddam Husain meant by his recent inflammatory 
speech against Israel. Bandar had earlier arrange a cease-fire in 1988 of the Iran-Iraq War. Saddam, who still felt 
humiliated by Israel’s destruction of his nuclear research reactor in Osirak in 1981, simply stated that the U.S. 
should not once again provide cover for an Israeli attack because Iraq would respond directly against Israel. This 
message was conveyed directly to President Bush. See Bob Woodward, The Commanders(NY, 1991), pp. 199-
204. 
3. See Woodward, 290-296. 
4. Again consult Woodward, 35-42, 331-335 and 353-362, who has presented one of the most succinct 
behind-the-scenes account of events leading up to the Gulf War. The U.S. Senate voted 52 to 47 for war and the 
House, 250-183. 
5. Judith Miller, God Has Ninety-Nine Names(NY 1996), 310-311. 
6. This matter is only touched upon by Daniel Yergin in his study, The Prize( NY 1991), 198-203, but the 
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the case of the Turkish Petroleum Company claims. On the disruption of oil markets during the Gulf War, see 
Yergin, 770-777. 
7. (NY 1993), see especially the chapter : "The Gulf War and Its Aftermath", pp.191-208. 
8. Ben Zvi, 182-185. This trend within Israel was of course disrupted when Arafat and many of his 
Palestinian supporters sided with Saddam Husain during the few days of warfare. Such a stance guaranteed that 
the thousands of Palestinians who held good positions in the Gulf States would lose their jobs and be forced to 
emigrate elsewhere. 
9. The sanctions committee was set up on August 6, 1990. For detailed information about the effect of 
sanctions on Iraqi society, one may consult "A Dim Light For Iraqis at the End of a Long Tunnel," in the 
authoritative Washington Report on Middle Eastern Affairs XIX(Oct.-Nov. 2000), 34-35 and the excellent study of 
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the hundreds of thousands of deaths of Iraqis by sanctions and war, Ramsay Clark, ed., Challenge to Genocide( 
NY 1998), passim. 
10. It is well known that thousands of Iraqis are suffering from cancer induced by the spent Uranium in the 
artillery shells used by Americans in the War. 
11. For Chomsky’s and Aruri’s articles, see Anthony Arnove, ed., Iraq Under Siege, The Deadly Impact of 
Sanctions and War, South End Press, Cambridge, MA. 1998, 7-56. The other articles are also important. 
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